Hamilton v. Leavy by unknown
1997 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-30-1997 
Hamilton v. Leavy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997 
Recommended Citation 
"Hamilton v. Leavy" (1997). 1997 Decisions. 143. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/143 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1997 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed June 30, 1997 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
Jerome K. Hamilton appeals from a district court order 
granting a motion to dismiss his civil suit, litigated pro se. 
Hamilton brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against Faith Levy, Pamela Faulkner, William Queener, 
members of the Multi-Disciplinary Team at the Gander Hill 
prison facility in Wilmington, Delaware (the "MDT 
defendants"), and Frances Lewis, chairperson of the 
Delaware Department of Corrections Central Institutional 
Classification Committee ("CICC"). He alleges that the 
appellees violated his right to be free from cruel and 
unusual punishment, guaranteed by the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, 
Hamilton claims that these defendants knew of and 
disregarded an excessive risk to his safety posed by other 
inmates. 
 
This case requires us to determine whether the district 
court misapplied the Supreme Court's decision in Farmer v. 
Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994), in which the Court 
announced the guidelines for determining "deliberate 
indifference" on the part of prison officials for purposes of 
Eighth Amendment claims. We must also determine 
whether the district court erred when it declined to allow 
Hamilton to pursue discovery, denied his request for the 
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appointment of counsel and refused to permit him to 
amend his complaint to add new defendants. 
 




Hamilton has a long history of being assaulted 
throughout the Delaware prison system. He has been 
transferred out of the State of Delaware twice, and has 
been placed in protective custody on numerous occasions. 
While an explanation for each of Hamilton's violent clashes 
throughout the prison system is absent from the record, 
the fact that Hamilton's safety has been an ongoing concern 
is not in dispute. 
 
The earliest evidence of violence against Hamilton dates 
back to February 14, 1976. On that day he was stabbed by 
a fellow inmate while incarcerated in the Maximum 
Security Unit ("MSU") at the Delaware Correctional Center 
in Smyrna, Delaware ("DCC"). Over a year later, on May 8, 
1977, an inmate attacked Hamilton with a chair in the 
MSU. On August 1, 1977, he was assaulted in the MSU by 
twenty inmates who stabbed him in the back, stomach and 
arms. He also suffered severe lacerations to the head and 
face, which required his hospitalization at the Institution 
Hospital at Gander Hill. For his own protection, Hamilton 
remained confined there for four months with no outside 
activities whatsoever. During that time, Hamilton made an 
effort to return to the MSU, but due to threats by other 
inmates, he was placed in protective custody pursuant to 
the "Inmates Rule (31) Emergency Provisions" procedure. 
Appellant's app. at 44a. Hamilton was later transferred out 
of the Delaware state prison system entirely and was held 
in federal custody in Leavenworth, Kansas. The stated 
reasons for Hamilton's transfer were to alleviate 
overcrowding and because "[Hamilton] had been assaulted 
and stabbed at the DCC and the staff feared for his safety." 
Id. at 27a. 
 
At some point between 1982 and 1984, Hamilton was 
returned from federal custody to the custody of the State of 
Delaware, where he was again incarcerated at Gander Hill. 
The assaults continued. On March 25, 1985, he was 
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transferred to the general prison population at Sussex 
Correctional Institution in Georgetown, Delaware. There, he 
eventually notified officials that his "life was in danger" and 
that he would "be killed" if he remained there. Prison 
officials believed him. The following week, they 
recommended that he be placed in protective custody back 
at Gander Hill. Hamilton was later transferred, on April 11, 
1986, from Gander Hill to DCC. Hamilton was informed 
that the reason for his transfer was that "it [was] felt that 
[he] may be in danger of physical harm should [he] 
continue to be housed [at Gander Hill]." Id. at 17a. In a 
document prepared by a member of the MDT, it was 
explained that "[Hamilton] was moved because he required 
protective custody in a more secure setting in that his life 
was in danger at [Gander Hill]." Id. at 47a. On May 21, 
1986, Hamilton was placed in protective custody at DCC. 
 
For reasons not apparent from the record, and despite 
the serious concerns described above, Hamilton was again 
returned to Gander Hill at some point in 1986. At that 
time, Hamilton cooperated with an official investigation of 
drug trafficking that led to the arrest of officers and 
inmates at Gander Hill. Not surprisingly, Hamilton was 
then labeled "a snitch" within certain circles of the prison 
population. Id. at 10a. This latest development required 
numerous transfers of Hamilton into protective custody. 
Frances Lewis, CICC Chairperson, personally approved 
transfers on November 16, 1988 and February 8, 1989, and 
Hamilton was recommended for protective custody again on 
May 11, 1989. Even up until November 30, 1989, the MDT 
acknowledged that Hamilton's need for protective custody 
had not changed. In fact, while Hamilton was still in 
protective custody at Gander Hill, the MDT recommended 
on August 17, 1990, that he be transferred "out of the 
building" to protective custody at another location. Id. at 
29a. Because there appeared to be no safe place for 
Hamilton in the Delaware prisons, on September 4, 1990, 
prison officials decided that Hamilton would be transferred 
to Virginia to ensure his safety. Id. at 18a. 
 
On December 12, 1991, Hamilton was temporarily 
returned from Virginia to Gander Hill for the purpose of 
prosecuting two civil actions in the Delaware courts, one of 
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which was an action against Delaware prison officials. 
Concern for Hamilton's safety was again triggered, when, 
on March 25, 1992, in a room at Gander Hill with several 
inmates present, a guard called Hamilton "a good telling 
mother f_____g snitcher." Id. at 25a. A committee appointed 
to investigate this incident, apparently recognizing the risk 
to Hamilton's safety, concluded that "comments of this 
nature [have] the potential of a major disturbance and 
requires immediate action." Id. at 24a. The guard who made 
the statement was later reprimanded. 
 
On June 18, 1992, Levy, Faulkner and Queener 
convened a MDT meeting at Gander Hill to review 
Hamilton's security classification and consider his request 
to be placed in protective custody. The MDT made an 
administrative summary of the reasons for Hamilton's 
earlier transfer to Virginia and for his return to Delaware. 
After reviewing Hamilton's history of being assaulted in 
prison, the MDT unanimously recommended that Hamilton 
be placed in protective custody. But despite their own 
recommendation, the MDT took no immediate action to 
protect Hamilton. The MDT's report and recommendation 
were forwarded to the CICC, chaired by Lewis. The CICC 
thereafter made a unanimous determination to take"no 
action." 
 
Consequently, Hamilton remained in the general 
population. Less than two months following the CICC's "no 
action" determination, on August 5, 1992, Hamilton was 
assaulted by another prisoner. The prisoner who pleaded 
guilty to the assault stated that he committed the offense 
because Hamilton was "a snitcher on inmates and officers 
at [Gander Hill]." Appellant's br. at 22. As a result of the 
assault, Hamilton required surgery to repair two jaw 
fractures and currently has two metal plates in his both 
sides of his jaw. 
 
Hamilton thereafter filed suit in district court, claiming 
that prison officials violated state prison regulations and 
showed a deliberate indifference to his safety, thereby 
violating his constitutional right under the Eighth 
Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 
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II. 
 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the MDT defendants on the ground that they recommended 
that Hamilton be placed in protective custody, and were 
without authority to effectuate that recommendation. The 
district court also granted summary judgment in Lewis's 
favor on the ground that the facts did not establish that 
she was aware of the risk to Hamilton, and that a 
reasonable factfinder could not find otherwise. This appeal 
followed. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1342. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over a district 
court's order granting summary judgment. Public Interest 
Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn 
Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 76 (3d Cir. 1990)."[W]e apply 
the same test as the district court should have used 
initially," id. at 76, to determine if there are any remaining 
issues of material fact that would enable Hamilton to 
prevail after giving him the benefit of every favorable 
inference that can be drawn from the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 




The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment protects prisoners against the 
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Whitley v. 
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 219 (1986) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). This constitutional limitation on punishment has 
been interpreted to impose a duty upon prison officials to 
take reasonable measures " `to protect prisoners from 
violence at the hands of other prisoners.' " Farmer v. 
Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1976 (1994) (quoting Cortes- 
Quinones v. Jimeniz-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 
1988)). While "[i]t is not . . . every injury suffered by one 
prisoner at the hands of another that translates into 
constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for a 
victim's safety," "[b]eing violently assaulted in prison is 
simply not `part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay 
for their offenses against society.' " Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 
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1977 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 45 U.S. 337, 345 
(1981)). Accordingly, "[a] prison official's deliberate 
indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to an 
inmate violates the Eighth Amendment." Id., at 1974. 
 
For an inmate to prevail on an Eighth Amendment 
failure-to-protect claim, two requirements must be met. 
First, the prisoner must demonstrate "that he is 
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of 
serious harm." Id. at 1977. This element is satisfied when 
the alleged "punishment" is "objectively sufficiently 
serious." Id. Second, the prison officials involved must have 
a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. at 1979 ("[O]ur 
cases mandate inquiry into a prison official's state of mind 
when it is claimed that the official has inflicted cruel and 
unusual punishment."). Specifically, the inmate must show 
that the official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk 
to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware 
of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [s]he must also 
draw the inference." Id. 
 
Consequently, to survive summary judgment on an 
Eighth Amendment claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
a plaintiff is required to produce sufficient evidence of (1) a 
substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants' 
deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation. 






In its grant of summary judgment in favor of Lewis, the 
district court found "no credible evidence of record that 
[Hamilton] faced a substantial risk of serious harm from 
any inmate during his temporary classification to the 
general population [at Gander Hill], or that [Lewis] had 
knowledge of such so as to justify characterizing her June 
24, 1992 classification decision as the infliction of 
punishment." Dist. ct. op. at 7. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied 
primarily on Lewis's affidavit in which she explains her 
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refusal to place Hamilton in protective custody despite the 
MDT's recommendation to provide him with such 
protection. She claimed that "Hamilton was kept at [Gander 
Hill] because there was no evidence of a problem there." 
She further commented that "[i]f valid evidence of a danger 
to plaintiff existed at [Gander Hill], the Committee would 
have classified him appropriately." The district court 
considered Lewis's affidavit conclusive in determining that 
no material issues of fact existed for resolution at trial. Our 
review of the record brings us to the opposite conclusion. 
 
The district court erred in failing to acknowledge the 
MDT's recommendation that Hamilton should be placed in 
protective custody as evidence that he faced a substantial 
risk of serious harm. The MDT members, on June 18, 
1992, considered Hamilton's history of violent clashes 
throughout the Delaware prison system, and acknowledged 
his statement that "protective custody concerns exist 
throughout the state."1 The MDT members then concluded, 
unanimously, that Hamilton was in such danger as to 
justify isolating him from the general population in 
protective custody. Because there is no indication in the 
record that the MDT's recommendation was unwarranted or 
one-sided, we see no basis for the district court's 
conclusion that there was no evidence that Hamilton faced 
a substantial risk of serious harm. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court concluded that Hamilton failed to initiate the 
classification review proceeding in June, 1992, and that this militated 
against a finding of deliberate indifference on the part of Lewis. However, 
the MDT Memorandum reveals that Hamilton did "claim that the 
protective custody concerns still exist throughout the state." Appellant's 
app. at 11a. We note that the district court's reasoning suggesting that 
Hamilton was required to give advance notice of his safety concerns is 
inconsistent with the teachings of Farmer. There, while the plaintiff 
voiced no concern about his placement in the general population where 
he was assaulted, this fact was insufficient to support a grant of 
summary judgment for the defendants. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1984-85 
("[T]he District Court may have mistakenly thought that advance notice 
was a necessary element of an Eighth Amendment claim. . . ."). 
Accordingly, in this case, the question of who initiated the June 18, 
1992 classification review will have no bearing on the question of Lewis's 
awareness of the risk posed to Hamilton. 
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Yet, a showing that there was an excessive risk to 
Hamilton's safety is alone insufficient to preclude summary 
judgment. Hamilton must also show that the harm he 
suffered was caused by a prison official's deliberate 
indifference to his safety. Deliberate indifference can be 
shown when "a prison official knows of and disregards an 
excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Farmer, 114 S. 
Ct. at 1979. We are therefore required to "focus[on] what 
a defendant's mental attitude actually was (or is), rather 
than what it should have been (or should be)." Id. at 1980. 
The Court believed this subjective approach to be 
appropriate because it "isolates those who inflict 
punishment." Id. 
 
In this case, Lewis was made aware of a substantial risk 
to Hamilton's safety when she reviewed the MDT's 
unanimous recommendation to place Hamilton in protective 
custody. Lewis never suggested that she was not in 
possession of the MDT recommendation or that the 
recommendation was baseless. Indeed, it could be argued 
that Lewis had good reason to believe that the MDT's fears 
were well-founded since Lewis herself approved Hamilton 
for protective custody on two prior occasions. Moreover, 
since Lewis should be charged with knowledge of 
Hamilton's known cooperation with prison officials and the 
subsequent branding of Hamilton as a "snitch," appellant's 
app. at 47a, a factfinder could infer that Lewis knew that 
the threat to Hamilton's safety was imminent. 
 
A prison official's knowledge of a substantial risk is a 
question of fact and can, of course, be proved by 
circumstantial evidence. Id. ("Whether a prison official had 
the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question 
of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, 
including inference from circumstantial evidence . . . ."); see 
Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(existence of circumstantial evidence that prison officials 
were aware of risk posed to prisoner by asbestos precluded 
summary judgment). The Farmer Court explained in 
hypothetical terms the type of circumstantial evidence 
sufficient for a finding of actual knowledge on the part of a 
prison official: 
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if an Eighth Amendment plaintiff presents evidence 
showing that a substantial risk of inmate attacks was 
`longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly 
noted by prison officials in the past,' and the 
circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being 
sued had been exposed to information concerning the 
risk and thus `must have known' about it, then such 
evidence could be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to 
find that the defendant-official had actual knowledge of 
the risk. 
 
Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1981-82. 
 
The circumstantial evidence of record in this case, which 
is essentially identical to those hypothesized by the Farmer 
Court, does not appear to have been considered by the 
district court. However, these facts constitute sufficient 
circumstantial evidence upon which a factfinder could 
conclude that Lewis "must have known" of the risk to 
Hamilton's safety. Id. See id. at 1981 ("[A] factfinder may 
conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk 
from the very fact that the risk was obvious."). Accordingly, 
based on the circumstantial evidence offered by Hamilton 
which demonstrates the existence of an obvious risk, 
Lewis's decision to consciously disregard that risk 
(memorialized by the CICC "no action" decision), and 
Hamilton's resulting injuries which occurred less than two 
months following the CICC's decision to take "no action," 





Moreover, the record indicates that the MDT defendants 
took no immediate action following its recommendation to 
the CICC that Hamilton should be placed in protective 
custody. It also took no action after that recommendation 
was rejected. The district court found that Hamilton's 
Eighth Amendment claim could not be maintained against 
the MDT defendants. It reasoned that because the MDT 
defendants were without authority to effectuate their own 
recommendation that Hamilton be placed in protective 
custody, they could not be found to have deliberately 
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disregarded serious risks to his safety. In other words, the 
court found that the MDT's submission of the report to 
Lewis amounted to a reasonable response to the risk 
Hamilton faced, which would preclude liability against 
them. 
 
The Farmer Court specifically noted that"prison officials 
who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or 
safety may be found free from liability if they responded 
reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not 
averted." Id. at 1982-83. If a prison official responds 
reasonably to a risk to an inmate's safety, he or she cannot 
be found to have acted with a sufficiently culpable state of 
mind. Id. at 1983 ("Whether one puts it in terms of duty or 
deliberate indifference, prison officials who act reasonably 
cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause."); id. ("A prison official's duty under 
the Eighth Amendment is to ensure `reasonable safety.' ") 
(quoting Hellig v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993)). Here, 
while it appears that the MDT defendants acted reasonably 
in following the internal prison procedures by 
recommending to the CICC that Hamilton be placed in 
protective custody, the reasonableness of their actions 
following the rejection of that recommendation remains a 
question. 
 
The MDT defendants stated in their affidavits that they 
"did everything they could" with respect to ensuring 
Hamilton's safety when they recommended he be placed in 
protective custody. But the district court's refusal to 
consider whether the MDT defendants could have taken 
further action failed to give Hamilton the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences, to which he is entitled, as the non- 
movant. Indeed, Hamilton's counter-argument, asserted in 
his pro se complaint, is that the MDT defendants could 
have taken additional steps, such as place him in 
administrative segregation. Because neither party presented 
conclusive evidence on this issue, there remains a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding whether the MDT's 
response to the risk Hamilton faced was reasonable. 
Matshushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (to survive summary judgment, 
non-movant must only show more than "some metaphysical 
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doubt as to the material facts"); Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. 
BMW of North America, 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992) 
("To raise a genuine issue of material fact [the] opponent 
need not match, item for item, each piece of evidence 
proffered by the movant. In practical terms, if the opponent 
has exceeded the `mere scintilla' threshold and has offered 
a genuine issue of material fact, then the court cannot 
credit the movant's version of events against the opponent 
. . . ."); Ely v. Hall's Motor Transit Co., 590 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 
1978) (any doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of 
material fact will be resolved against the movant). The 
failure of the MDT defendants to take additional steps 
beyond the recommendation of protective custody could be 
viewed by a factfinder as the sort of deliberate indifference 
to inmate safety that the Constitution forbids. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the district court's grant of 




Hamilton also alleges that the district court erred by 
denying his request for the appointment of counsel. In 
denying Hamilton's request, the district court considered 
the factors we announced in Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 
155-56 (3d Cir. 1993), for determining whether the 
appointment of counsel is warranted. We review the district 
court's refusal to appoint counsel to Hamilton for abuse of 
discretion. Id. at 155 n.4. 
 
In Tabron we held that when deciding whether to appoint 
counsel for indigent litigants, district courts should 
consider the merits of the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff's 
ability to present his or her case, the difficulty of the legal 
issues, and the degree to which the case will require 
extensive factual investigation or turn on credibility 
determinations. Id. at 156. 
 
After weighing the various Tabron factors, the district 
court concluded that Hamilton could not demonstrate 
"special circumstances indicat[ing] the likelihood of 
substantial prejudice to him resulting . . . from his probable 
inability without such assistance to present the facts and 
legal issues to the court in a complex but arguably 
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meritorious case." Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 26 
(3d Cir. 1984). 
 
We are unable to agree with this conclusion for two 
reasons: first, the district court erred in concluding that 
Hamilton did not have a colorable claim; second, the record 
indicates that Hamilton may be ill-equipped to represent 
himself or to litigate this claim inasmuch as there is 
unrebutted medical evidence that he suffers from a 
paranoid delusional disorder. The district court's failure to 
consider the weight of this fact demonstrates that more 
serious consideration should have been given to Hamilton's 
request for the appointment of counsel. We will therefore 
reverse on this issue and remand to the district court with 
instructions to appoint counsel for Hamilton. See Tucker v. 
Randall, 948 F.2d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1991) (appointment of 
counsel appropriate when plaintiff presented colorable 
claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs 




We do not believe that Hamilton's request for additional 
discovery and for leave to amend his complaint require 
extended discussion. The district court denied these 
requests on the ground that each was a futile attempt to 
salvage Hamilton's action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As we 
have explained above, the district court misconstrued 
Farmer, and Hamilton does have a colorable Eighth 
Amendment claim. We will, therefore, remand this issue to 
the district court with instructions to permit Hamilton to 
pursue full and reasonable discovery as is consistent with 
the Farmer mandate relating to circumstantial evidence, as 
described above. Because Hamilton's initial discovery 
request involved an effort to obtain the names of those 
officials who were aware of the substantial risk to his 
safety, and that request was erroneously denied, it is 
appropriate that Hamilton be allowed to amend his 
complaint as well.2 Small v. Lehman, 98 F.3d 762 (3d Cir. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Our reversal in this matter renders it unnecessary to reach Hamilton's 
contention that the district court improperly converted appellees' motion 
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to one of summary judgment. 
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For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court's order of November 2, 1994, granting summary 
judgment to the MDT defendants. We will also reverse the 
district court's order of May 26, 1995, granting summary 
judgment to Lewis, and remand this case with instructions 
to appoint counsel for Hamilton,3 to permit him to 
undertake discovery and to permit him to amend his 
complaint. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 




3. Judge Nygaard would not directly appoint counsel, but, believing that 
the issue is best addressed by the district court in the first instance, 
would remand the question for that court to exercise its discretion, as 
required by Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 1993).                                 
 
                                14 
